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FOREIGN POLICY bulletin

AN ANALYSIS OF CURRENT INTERNATIONAL EVENTS

VOLUME 37 NUMBER 9

Canada Marking Time

by Mason Wade

No clear picture of Canada's future course has emerged in the six months since Prime Minister John Diefenbaker's Progressive Conservative government took office, following the electoral upset of June 10 which drove the Liberals out after 22 years in power. The Conservatives failed to win a working majority in the House of Commons, and it soon became apparent that neither the socialist Co-operative Commonwealth Federation nor the Social Credit party would supply them with one. As a result, there has been recurrent speculation that the new government might call a snap election, hoping to gain control of the House.

The possibility of an early fall election vanished when plans were announced for Queen Elizabeth, as Queen of Canada, to open Parliament in person on October 14 for the first time. Then the prospect of a never popular winter election grew dim when Mr. St. Laurent, the Liberal party leader, who had announced on September 6 his intention to relinquish the leadership as soon as a successor could be chosen, refused at the opening of the autumn session either to move a motion of want of confidence in the government or to

support such a motion by any other party. Despite the vigor with which the official Opposition and the minor parties attacked the government, it was clear that neither of the major parties really wanted to appeal to the people again until campaign chests could be replenished. The Conservatives needed time to settle into unfamiliar office; the Liberals needed time to choose a new leader and to reorganize their party machinery.

The Diefenbaker government has sought, in accordance with its campaign promises and Conservative tradition, to put more emphasis on Canada's relations with Britain and less on its relations with the United States, but it has found difficulty in translating this emphasis into practical measures. The plan for a 15 per cent shift of Canadian trade from the United States to Britain, which Mr. Diefenbaker announced to the press early in July on his return from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London, has proved something of an embarrassment to the government in its relations with both Britain and the United States. At the Mont Tremblant Commonwealth Finance Ministers' Conference, held on Mr. Diefenbaker's invitation at the

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end of September, Peter Thorneycroft, British chancellor of the exchequer, took the wind out of the Canadian government's sails by proposing complete free trade between Britain and Canada—a suggestion which was violently rejected by the Canadian manufacturers who form the hard core of Conservative support. At the subsequent Anglo-Canadian talks in Ottawa the question was referred to a Commonwealth trade conference in 1958, while Canada agreed to shift government purchasing from the United States to Britain and to send a trade mission there.

Britain — or U.S.?

From the point of view of most Canadians, Mr. Diefenbaker's forthright call at Dartmouth College on September 7 for serious consideration by the United States of urgent problems in Canadian-American economic relations has so far been unsatisfactorily answered. At the Washington meeting on October 7-8 of the Joint United States-Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, made up of cabinet ministers, the United States failed to satisfy Canada's angry complaints about American wheat-surplus disposal policies. Washington said it would attempt to avoid interfering with normal commercial marketing, but Canada was forced to give assurances that it would not build a new Commonwealth preferential tariff system and that United States capital was still welcome in Canada. The observation to the press by Secretary of

Commerce Sinclair Weeks that "we fixed 'em," although it was subsequently explained away, roused wide resentment in Canada and was used by the Opposition to taunt Finance Minister Donald Fleming. The Opposition also questioned the government's acceptance of United States control over Canadian air defense under the North American Air Defense Command announced in November, and the shelving of the highly controversial international natural gas, oil and waterpower problems by referring them for study to a Royal Commission on Energy.

During Parliament's autumn session, which proved far livelier than had been anticipated, the two principal candidates for the Liberal leadership, which will be decided at a party convention on January 14-16—former External Affairs Minister Lester B. Pearson and former Health and Welfare Minister Paul Martin—took an active part in this skirmishing. Mr. Pearson, who has been writing a widely syndicated nonpolitical column on foreign affairs, sought to demonstrate in the House his competence in economic matters as well. Mr. Martin adopted a more down-to-earth political attitude by seeking to make capital of all the government's sins of omission and commission. The award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mr. Pearson helped to strengthen his chances for the leadership and to offset Mr. Martin's greater practical political skill and experience.

While the government's program has made satisfactory progress in Parliament, the vigorous opposition it

has encountered raises the possibility that an election may be held before next April, the date now most generally anticipated. In the meantime the new government's manifold problems have been complicated by the prospect of diminishing revenues as well as rising unemployment (now twice as high as a year ago), both due to a slackening of the Canadian economy, which reflects the prevailing economic uncertainty in the United States. These factors have undoubtedly influenced Mr. Diefenbaker's reluctance to present a budget and to risk an election.

Despite the Conservatives' campaign promises and some strong post-election speeches, there have been as yet no sweeping changes in Canadian domestic or foreign policies. The two most pressing domestic problems—the federal provincial financial agreements and the energy export policy—have been put off for later settlement. So has the thorny question of the appointment of a successor to Governor General Vincent Massey.

In the foreign field Canada's policy remains based on support of the Commonwealth and the Colombo Plan, of NATO and the United Nations, and of good relations with the United States, which may actually benefit from the government's emphasis on relations with Britain. For Canadians have a way of reacting against British or American influence when either appears to be dominating Canadian policy.

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Middle East — New U.S. Responsibility?

The United States is getting plenty of advice on how to deal with the Middle East situation. The trouble is that it is conflicting advice.

Walter Lippmann suggests that American oil firms upgrade their contracts so that both the producing and transit countries of the Middle East get a better dollar deal. He also urges that the United States should stop trying to dragoon these countries into military anti-Russian pacts. It is his belief that the Arabs really do not want to expel either the United States or the U.S.S.R. from the area and prefer having both great powers competing for their favors.

George F. Kennan, former American ambassador to Moscow, who is teaching this year at Oxford University, advises Washington to stop trying to appease the Arab countries. Reduce the West's dependence on the oil of hostile Middle East regimes, he argues, and these countries will soon be seeking our friendship and help. If they go Communist, he says in effect, that is their kettle of fish. He agrees with Lippmann in urging an end to military pacts as the cure-all.

Then there is Joseph Alsop, writing from the area, who says there is only one way to escape a policy debacle in the Middle East, and that is to mobilize the United States almost as if we were in time of war. Washington must make clear that it intends to be second to none in weapon-eering, missiles, rockets, satellites, space control. He claims the Russians have promised to help the Arabs, both diplomatically and militarily, in their struggle with Israel over borders—and this, concludes Mr. Alsop, almost surely will mean war.

But Alsop disagrees thoroughly with Kennan, who would let the Arab countries go Communist if they wished. And he differs with Lippmann, contending that the Arabs would tie up with the U.S.S.R. at any price if thereby they could get Soviet help in crushing Israel.

Conflicting Counsels

Meanwhile, Adlai E. Stevenson is reported to have suggested a NATO guarantee of the present Arab-Israeli boundaries and an agreement with the U.S.S.R. on an arms embargo for the area. And Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt has asked for the same policy moves, but with the United States rather than NATO doing the guaranteeing of Middle East borders.

Finally, Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin, who wrote President Eisenhower on December 10, said all that is needed to "normalize the situation in the Middle East" is a Russo-American pact. Both countries, said Mr. Bulganin, should pledge "not to take any steps infringing the independence of the countries of the area and should renounce the use of force in the solution of questions bearing on the Middle East."

Of all these, and plenty of other proposals, the Bulganin suggestion is without doubt the simplest and easiest to accomplish—if it were honest and sincere. But this is what Washington doubts. Anyone who recalls Hungary knows Moscow's ideas on "renouncing the use of force" in settling issues; and everyone who considers the plight of the satellite countries of Eastern Europe can see what Moscow thinks of "the independence of countries".

As of now the United States has

certain specific Middle East commitments, however broadly defined. It has commitments under the United Nations Charter to resolve differences peacefully. It has commitments to Turkey as a NATO member to come to the aid of that country instantly if it is attacked by the U.S.S.R. It has commitments under the Eisenhower Doctrine to fight Communist aggression in the area if requested. It has assured Israel that that country's existence, as distinct from specific borders, is a matter of concern to the United States.

Washington is suspicious of an arms embargo agreement with the Russians in that area and mistrusts their aims. It defends the Eisenhower Doctrine. It supports the Baghdad pact. It is ready to guarantee any border Israel and the Arabs can jointly accept. It is opposed to military build-ups beyond those needed for national defense. It is prepared to give economic and financial assistance to help solve the area's problems.

In short, the United States seems resigned to continuing its present policy in the Middle East. Some people might call this "muddling through"; others perhaps might call it "steady the boat." Most of all, Washington wants, if possible, to cool off tempers in the area, to ease enmities, to improve living standards and to check Communist infiltration. The only question is, How best to accomplish these many, often conflicting, aims?

NEAL STANFORD

(This is the fourth in a series of eight articles on "Great Decisions . . . 1958"—What Should U.S. Do in a Changing World?—a comprehensive review of American foreign policy.)



What Should U.S. Do To Match Russia?

EDWIN L. WEISL, committee counsel—Dr. Teller, looking again at the immediate danger and the short-range program, have you any opinion as to what the United States should be doing now to meet the danger?

DR. TELLER—Well, I would say that the immediate danger very obviously is in the missile field.

As I have said, we have ourselves a very healthy missile program, and we had it for a few years.

First of all, I would like to say what I would not do. I think that I would not recommend to embark on a rapid reorganization of the effort. This could rock the boat so that our effort is actually retarded rather than advanced.

At the same time, I would say that I am sure that the effort, which is an excellent effort as it stands today, is not good enough. I am quite sure that once an emergency has become clear to the American people, as this emergency has become clear, there are ways and means by which further acceleration is possible.

We Must Spend Money

One very important thing will be that we must be generous with money, and that we must apply more money to the program in any place where it can be applied in an effective manner; and there are many such places.

I think that unless such reasonable expenditures are made right away in fields like the Atomic Energy Commission and also, I am sure, in fields like the missile fields, we will have fallen far short of the kind of response which we should make to the

present situation.

Q.—What other suggestions have you, Dr. Teller, to accelerate our present effort to meet the danger that we face?

A.—I have no very specific suggestions. I would think that you have here a most excellent opportunity to find out from the companies which are working on this project; and from other companies which would like to be working on the project and which have available manpower, you can find out from them what kind of additional efforts are possible without dislocating other efforts.

We Must Accelerate Missiles

Because I feel very strongly that, across the board, everybody is most eager to go ahead with the program, and that we must go ahead with it, we must accelerate, without stopping other efforts.

I have perhaps this one specific suggestion which I am also sure does not require any great wisdom, and everybody is aware of it. We have quite a few programs in the Air Force, in the Army, in the Navy. Very nice things can be said about all of these efforts, and I should like to say that it is important to make, to bring about as close cooperation, as close exchange between these various efforts, as well as between the efforts going on in the competing industrial companies; in other words, the competition, which is in general a good thing, should not be carried to the point where we are keeping secrets from each other.

Now, I don't think this has been done, but one should do one's very

Develop New Weapons

Excerpts from the testimony given by Dr. Edward Teller, noted physicist, known particularly for his work in connection with the developing of the H-bomb, at the United States Senate Preparedness subcommittee hearing on the missiles program, as reported in *The New York Times* on November 27.

best to foster exchange of information.

I should think that as far as the efforts within this country are concerned, these are the simple and general things that I can say.

Q.—Have you any other views as to the strengthening of our alliances abroad in connection with this effort to defend our security?

A.—I have been this fall over in England and looked at their air industry show, and I was most impressed by this show, by the excellence of the British effort, not in the rocket field, but in a field close to that of the rockets.

I think that it is most important that we cooperate with our very able friends, not only in Britain, but I would like to see this done across the board in the NATO countries and maybe with other allies.

I think that the present emergency is perhaps greater than the emergency was at that time [World War II], and it is greater for the simple reason that it is less apparent. We are more apt to forget about the fact that we are in a very dangerous situation because no actual shooting is going on.

I think that the situation is dangerous enough to justify, in fact, absolutely to require, the fullest cooperation with our allies in the general field of developing technical things in the scientific field and most particularly in the application of science and technology to the development of weapons.

I would like to see such a cooperation go on jointly and closely and

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Use Ideas — Not Weapons

Assistant Professor Philip Siekevitz of The Rockefeller Institute for Medical Research comments on Dr. Teller's testimony.

I HAVE become increasingly dismayed about the reaction, both public and private, to the fact of the sputniks. All that our public officials, from President Eisenhower on down, can manage to answer may be summed up in one word, "Missiles." And just recently Dr. Edward Teller gave forth with what has become his automatic answer, "Arm!"

In this latter case his earlier advice has now been proved wrong; he advocated our producing the H-bomb. As a result, we have now no greater security vis-à-vis Russia than we did five years ago. In fact, we have less. This should make it plain to all that we should not follow the advice of Dr. Teller nor of all of those who advocate a bigger and better and more frantic arms race as our answer to Russia.

I think that I am not the only one in this country who is left cold and troubled by these answers: How long is this arms race going to go on? Is this folly the only answer that American leadership can devise?

For a decade now we have witnessed bizarre inversions of logic, a schizophrenia of hope and terror, a malaise, a deadening of the human spirit, a complete lack of having human intelligence act upon human problems. Presumably we are in for a decade more of the same; that is, if the road upon which these men are leading us does not blow up in our faces.

Let me express my opinion as to what is troubling the American people since the sputnik came into ken. We as Americans have always prided ourselves on being leaders—not so

much on doing everything the best way that it could be done, but on being pioneers; we like to think of ourselves as always crossing the frontier.

Space—The New Frontier

It is obvious to all of us that the frontier for mankind now is space. No matter that we leave behind a messed-up earth; no matter that our own house is very much in disorder, the next frontier is space. What then could be more galling than to have our greatest competitor, a competitor whom we have constantly downgraded, become the pioneer?

In the minds of many of us we suddenly appear to ourselves as a ludicrous, frail, fearful old lady. This is to me the real meaning of the sputnik to Americans. Are we Americans as a nation so tired, so bored, so unimaginative, so fearful of the future? It is the complete lack of understanding of this which prompts our leaders to talk of more and more arms races.

This journeying, this leap into space, is gloriously exciting. It is for many, and can become for most of our youth, the vision of the future; the exploration of our immediate cosmic neighborhood; the mystery of the other side of the moon, of the planets Venus and Mars. Here is mankind, the first of all earthly living beings, finally, after millions of years, freed from bondage to this planet, freed to seek the mysteries in outer space. What a thrilling joy!

Why cannot this greatest of all explorations become a joint effort of all the nations of the world? Why couldn't this have been President

Eisenhower's answer? And, finally, might not this joint effort by, in effect, all mankind be the spark, the kindling, upon which all of our earthly differences, all our earthly squabbles, be burned? Must our country wait until this impetus also comes from Russia?

I know the answer to these arguments and suggestions: "Idealism." However, let us go back to the time of the H-bomb decision, for I think that the circumstances at that time were strikingly similar to those of the present. In both cases a crossroads had been and is being reached. At the time of the H-bomb decision we thought we saw a chance to go ahead of the Russians in military prowess; at this time we think we should desperately be catching up to the Russians in military prowess. We made the expedient military decision then; we are in the process of making it again today. But what is the present result of this "realistic" decision? Is it not the state we are in today? Where is our security, and where is our ease about the future of our children?

Missiles Not Only Answer

I wish to emphasize the existence of a crossroads. There is a choice to be made. The building of the H-bomb and the acceleration of the missile program are not the only answers to our problems. At that earlier time we could have stopped, examined the political scene, and tried to make some sort of political agreement with the Russians. We can do the same today regarding Eastern Europe and Germany, the Near East and the Far East. These problems are not insoluble; they can be tackled by compromise. We do not have to give in completely to the Russians; neither do they have to give in to us. The result would be no worse militarily for us than it is today, and politically

it would certainly be far better.

Who is the realist and who is the idealist? Is he a realist who unthinkingly wishes to continue an armaments race, knowing that no armaments race ended in any other way but war? or is it he who wishes to explore ways and means of ending this race? Is he a realist who looks at the world the way it is in this nuclear age? or is it he who ideally looks through his ideological glasses and sets his course upon the rose-tinted road?

I am the idealist who believes that we are truly on the border of a Golden Age if we only wish it with our hearts and will it with our minds. If I were the voice of the country, I would shout, "Stop! We renounce war and the preparations for war. We will share with you all that is good in us; let us share with you all that is good in you. Join with us in giving 70 years of a good life to all men. Join with us in that greatest of all explorations for all mankind, that of our physical and our biological universe. Join with us in wrestling with God, for we are the equal of the angels, and our lives are holy!"

And if this plea were made, I would not be surprised by the fervent response the world over.

Teller

(Continued from page 68)

without barriers.

Q.—Do you think there is any danger in exchanging information and cooperating with our NATO and other allies?

A.—I think there is. We cannot fully cooperate without sharing our secrets. I think that if we share our secrets, if the secrets are become known to more people, then the possibility of a leak will necessarily increase. I think that this is a danger.

I think that this is, however, a danger which we must accept, be-

cause I think the danger of not cooperating, of falling behind, is, in my mind, much greater still.

Secrecy is still important, but less important than it used to be; and speed of development, on the other hand, is more important than ever.

I would advocate the closest cooperation with our allies, even if that means that some of our secrets will be lost a little faster, because we will, on the other hand, by cooperating with our allies, produce new secrets faster.

I don't know whether this is the right time for me perhaps to say at least a few words about our defense in the strict sense of the word, and about our meeting the immediate emergency that is facing us. . . . Well, it seems to me that there are two very obvious ways in which we can defend ourselves.

One is this: we must be prepared to strike back if we are hit, and we must be prepared in such a way that our ability to strike back cannot itself be destroyed by a surprise attack.

This is a difficult thing to do. In my opinion, it is possible.

First of all, it is possible because we have some organizations which have functioned extremely well, and which are functioning well, and I mean, in particular, the Strategic Air Command.

I believe that by being on the alert, by continuing to look to our defenses and by strengthening them, by making our bases harder to attack; by dispersing our retaliatory force in every way possible, we can continue to make it certain, and clearly certain, that we can return any attack to which we are subjected.

This is one very important phase of our immediate defense.

One thing that this requires, of course, is an early warning system, a radar system, where we have done a lot, where we should be doing more,

where we must spend more money wherever money can help, where we can be helped in turn, very greatly, by the observation of our allies, by the bases that our allies allow us to use.

In all these ways we can prepare our defenses and, of course, we have to be prepared to strike back with missiles as soon as we possibly can do so; in other words, develop our intermediate-range missiles and long-range missiles at the fastest rate possible.

FPA Bookshelf

NOVELS

A book of particular interest in this era of sputniks and scientific rivalry is the English translation of a Russian novel by Vladimir Dudintsev, *Not By Bread Alone* (New York, Dutton, 1957, \$4.95). In it the author has endeavored to point up the "deficiencies" and "difficulties" of the Soviet regime in the hope that they can be corrected. It is an interesting and, in a way, hopeful commentary on Soviet life today.

Revolution and Roses (New York, Knopf, 1957, \$3.50), P. H. Newby's second novel set in Egypt, is an amusing satire of life in that country at the time of the expulsion of Farouk.

One of Japan's foremost novelists, Shōhei Ooka, is author of a rather shocking novel, *Fires on the Plain* (New York, Knopf, 1957, \$3.50). It describes the disintegration of a Japanese soldier in the Philippines and the effect on him of his early Christian training.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY

War and Peace, by John Foster Dulles (New York, Macmillan, 1957, \$3.75).

The Secretary of States' formula for peace, originally written in 1950, and republished now with a new preface by Mr. Dulles in which he reemphasizes the basic thesis of his book, that peace can be won only by constant effort.

The Price of Power: America Since 1945, by Herbert Agar (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1957, \$3.50).

Mr. Agar, former editor of the *Louisville Courier-Journal*, vigorously interprets American foreign policy in the decade since 1945.

The Statistical Abstract of the United States 1957 (Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1957, \$3.50) is invaluable for up-to-date information about this country.



A Changing NATO in a Changing World

The controversy as to whether the heads-of-government NATO meeting of December 16-19 was a failure or a success misses the main point. The failure or success of that meeting will depend not so much on the decisions taken there, but on the extent to which these decisions will adapt NATO to our changing world.

For NATO, obviously, cannot stand still, any more than other human institutions. It must either change or disintegrate under the impact of new developments, not only in Europe, but throughout the world community. The heads of state, led by President Eisenhower, either realized this need in advance or accepted it, more or less reluctantly, in the course of the Paris negotiations.

Three main categories of changes were discussed at the meeting:

Changes in Weapons

1. *The need for strategic changes.*

The United States came to Paris with a proposal for adapting NATO defenses to new weapons—notably to the intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBM's), in which Russia is thought to have gained a lead over the United States. Washington wanted its NATO allies to permit the stationing of missiles and nuclear warheads on their territory, with the IRBM's placed at the disposal of General Lauris Norstad, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR), but was willing to have the NATO countries decide on the actual use of nuclear warheads in case of aggression. Britain supported the United States, although not without division among its own people.

The Continental countries, how-

ever, were wary or actually reluctant to have IRBM's placed within their borders, either because of their traditional leaning toward neutrality or because of their sensitivity to Russian threats. West Germany was particularly opposed to the use of missiles, not only by its own forces, but also by United States forces stationed on its territory. This general reluctance was reinforced by the knowledge that the United States would in any case be unable to provide IRBM's until 1960.

The American proposal was finally accepted "in principle," but subject to final decision by each of the countries concerned. Before going to Paris, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles had said that agreements "in principle" usually means disagreements in fact.

2. *NATO took note of changes outside Europe which are often opposed to the wishes of European nations.* In an attempt to avoid political conflicts among its members regarding extra-European areas (such as Cyprus, Tunisia, the Middle East, Indonesia), NATO declared its support of fuller and closer negotiations on future controversial issues.

Changes in Non-West

The NATO allies, however, tacitly acknowledged the changed situation in the non-Western world by making no commitments on issues such as Algeria, Arab-Israeli borders or West New Guinea, which might have brought sharp reactions from governments that deny the authority of a Western military coalition, defensive though it is in character, to determine their future. Under the circumstances, it is difficult to see

how NATO will be able to reach concerted decisions on problems outside Europe regarding which its members hold divided opinions.

Changes on Russia

3. *NATO took an important step toward recognizing the changed position of the U.S.S.R. in the post-sputnik era* by stating its "willingness to provide, preferably within the framework of the United Nations, any negotiations with the Soviet Union likely to lead to the implementation" of disarmament proposals. "Should the Soviet government refuse to participate in the work of the new Disarmament Commission," NATO declared, "we would welcome a meeting at foreign ministers' level."

This decision, which had been brewing for some time, was given new impetus by the letters addressed to NATO countries by Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin on the eve of the Paris meeting. The United States, which has been bearish about new top-level negotiations with Moscow since the Geneva summit meeting, was apparently unprepared for the strength of Europe's desire to explore the possibility of a settlement with Russia, and particularly for the leading role taken by Chancellor Konrad Adenauer in advocating new diplomatic overtures.

Two days after the NATO conference the Soviet government rejected foreign ministers' negotiations on disarmament, but left the door open for either a special session of the UN or an international conference. Disarmament talks, said Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko, could pave the way for an East-

West summit conference, and Communist party leader Nikita S. Khrushchev urged such a conference "to solve all the problems that trouble humanity, including disarmament."

The Eisenhower Administration remains sceptical about the practical advantages of another summit conference, although the President on December 23 stressed our willingness to negotiate. In Paris, the drive for negotiations with Russia took the spotlight away from plans for the use of missiles in Europe and is expected to gather momentum. Some Europeans favor negotiations side by side with the introduction of new weapons, endorsing the Churchillian slogan, "We aim to parley." Others hope to avoid the cost of additional armaments, or even reduce existing ones, by diplomatic efforts to ease East-West tensions.

In either case, the greatest change the United States encountered at the NATO meeting was this change in Western Europe's attitude toward Russia. Describing the mood in West Germany, *The New York Times* correspondent in Bonn summed it up this way, "The standpat policy of using guns and rockets as the sole instruments of policy bores the Germans. Boredom is about the worst thing one can say about a policy."

But the greatest change of all may still lie ahead. This is the change that may have to be made in the character

of NATO if it is to retain the support of its members over the long haul, avoid a head-on collision with the U.S.S.R., and win the interest of the Eastern European countries and of the uncommitted nations of the non-Western world.

Crusade — or Defense?

There are two main concepts of NATO's objectives. One is that it is to serve as a defensive alliance to deter aggression—by the U.S.S.R. at the present time, but conceivably by other potential aggressors as well. Under this concept it has been argued from the outset that NATO fitted legitimately into the framework of the United Nations Charter, which in Article 51 provides for regional measures of self-defense by UN members, pending the organization of a collective UN security force. It is entirely conceivable that other nations, not geographically linked to the Atlantic Community, would share this concept of regional self-defense against aggression if it were shorn of ideological implications.

The other concept is that NATO is an instrument to combat "international communism," the phrase often used in Paris by Mr. Dulles. As Cyrus L. Sulzberger pointed out in *The New York Times* on December 23, the UN does not discriminate between the political systems of its members, no matter how repugnant

they may be to some of them. A NATO so conceived has no attraction for Communist nations which seek to be independent of Russia, notably Yugoslavia, nor for the uncommitted nations of the Middle East, Asia and Africa, which are already inclined to regard NATO as a new embodiment of "imperialist" influence and want to be free to choose their own systems. Mr. Khrushchev, in his December 21 speech, called for the abandonment of ideological controversies between the West and the U.S.S.R. and acceptance of "the *status quo*—that is, the situation now prevailing in the world, characterized by the existence of socialist and capitalist states." The history of a social system, he went on, "will be decided not by rockets, not by atomic and hydrogen bombs, but by the fact of which system insures greater material and spiritual benefits to man."

The NATO members feel that there is ample reason to question the *status quo* in Europe, as illustrated by Hungary, yet they are not prepared to wage a preventive war for the purpose of altering it. The question thus remains whether the nuclear stalemate may create a climate of opinion in both West and East that would favor a reappraisal of the existing balance of forces without reference to ideological differences.

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